Crunching numbers, saving people

Collier, Paul. The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Paul Collier deserves -- and has received -- great credit for developing a method of statistical comparison for identifying the very poorest countries and estimating the costs of such poverty to them and potentially to all of us (short life spans, HIV and other devastating diseases, political violence that spreads beyond their borders, etc.). He and his co-researchers are especially keen on finding correlations between such wretched conditions and various geographical, demographic and historical factors, and comparing them to countries which share many such characteristics but that have broken out of poverty -- most notably, India and China, still beset by many problems but developing.

Very briefly: Collier has identified 58 countries, together comprising about 1/6 of the world's population or nearly 1,000,000,000 people, which are not only extremely poor, but which are not developing at all -- that is, they are experiencing no economic growth whatever. He declines to provide the full list, but in the course of the book he names several: most are in Africa, others include "Haiti, Laos, Burma [Myanmar], and the Central Asian countries, of which Afghanistan has been the most spectacular" development failure.

These are all places caught in "traps" of: recurring civil conflict, an abundance of a single natural resource whose exploitation (mostly for the benefit of outside corporations and the local corrupt elite) causes neglect of all other productive areas, being "landlocked with bad neighbors," and/or suffering "bad governance in a small country."

His question: How to get these countries out of the "traps" of undevelopment and get their economies growing?

Aid doesn't work, because too much of it is eaten up in corruption and inefficiency -- though without it, people's lives would be even worse. Collier gives several woeful examples, but also singles out a few heroes who have struggled to limit or end corruption, for example in Nigeria and Uganda.

Military intervention could work very well in those places wracked by civil war and terrorism, if only the richer countries dared to use it and if they avoided the disastrous misuse in the U.S.'s spectacular and self-defeating deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan. The other African countries are themselves too poor to intervene effectively in Sudan, for example, or the Congo, and would need the troops, arms and logistical support of richer countries. To be seen as legitimate, such intervention would have to come at the invitation of groups in the country or region that had wide popular support. And without raising any suspicion that the intervenors' true goal was to seize natural resources, e.g., oil. Unfortunately, in Collier's view, the U.S.'s bungling in Iraq has given intervention such a bad name that when the French, for example, send troops to a civil war zone, they are ordered to stay in barracks when the fighting breaks out. And we all remember the passivity of the Dutch UN troops in Srebrenica. UN troops in the Congo also seem to be more concerned for their own safety than that of the populace.

"By contrast, the British intervention in Sierra Leone [in 2000], Operation Palliser, has been a huge success. It has imposed security and maintained it once the RUF [rebel movement] was disposed of. The whole operation has been amazingly cheap," Collier writes (p. 127). Another example that seems to me to have been very positive (though I think Collier would disagree) was Cuban intervention in Namibia and Angola, saving both countries from far worse fates -- but of course that occurred during the Cold War, which distorted everything and made all sides' motives suspect.

"So we should intervene," says Collier, "but not necessarily everywhere. Sierra Leone rather than Iraq is the likely future of intervention opportunities in the bottom-billion countries. Look at the contrasts between the two situations. In Sierra Leone our [i.e., British] forces were invited in by the government and hugely welcomed by the local population. In Sierra Leone we could not be accused of going in for the oil, as there wasn't any." (pp. 128-9)

We also need to change laws and charters in the developed world, for example, banking secrecy regulations that permit corrupt dictators to steal their countries' wealth and hide it. (He has much more to say about laws and charters, including a proposed charter for world democracy.)

Finally, he proposes "trade policy for reversing marginalization" -- ending, for example, protective tariffs for European and U.S. agricultural interests that make it impossible for African cotton producers, etc., to compete in the only lucrative markets.

There's a lot of good stuff here, and Collier and his team keep on producing more such pointed analyses. Check out the Paul Collier home page. His statistical work is a good starting point for finding solutions, but it is only a starting point. To understand phenomena such as massive corruption, suicidal terrorism (such as in Mumbai this week), and the consequences and contradictions of rapacious global capitalism requires much more than number-crunching. The "traps" he lists are not all really comparable phenomena, though the statistical method showing only their numerical consequences make them appear so. Being landlocked with few natural resources is a geographical and historical phenomenon. As Collier sagely remarks, the reason so many such countries are in Africa is that, in other parts of the world, territories that are landlocked and have few resources don't become countries -- so that is a historical political problem, dating from the way colonial powers carved up the continent.

"The Natural Resource Trap," i.e., being "too rich" in petroleum, or diamonds, or some other valuable commodity, is not a geographical fatality at all. What makes such natural wealth a "trap" rather than an asset is obviously a problem of the way markets are organized and who has the means to exploit someone else's wealth. Bolivia under Morales, for example, is working to turn its natural gas into an asset.

But if we can think along two or more tracks at the same time, keeping in mind the statistical correlations that Collier and other investigators generate while also thinking broadly and deeply about markets and other social process in the manner of, say, Ulrich Beck, Alain Touraine and others, we may seriously address these problems.

One minor quibble: The cover declares the book a winner of the "Lionel Gelber Prize for excellence in writing on international relations." It seems to me that the writing would have been more excellent had Collier found a better metaphor than "traps" to describe those difficulties and had he not repeatedly referred, with no apparent irony, to landlocked countries as "missing the boat" (of development).

Architecture for our times

Susana and I had the opportunity to exchange ideas with many African architects at the conference in Kumasi, Ghana. Here's one we didn't meet: Tanzanian-born architect David Adjaye has a lot to tell us about the meanings of buildings in all parts of the world.

Here, David Adjaye talks with Thelma Golden about architecture in contemporary culture and what buildings can be in the twenty-first century. From “Stories from the Near Future,” the 2008 New Yorker Conference.Constructing Culture.

See also Adjaye Associates web.

Talking heads

Don't miss this insightful newscast by the Onion reportorial team, telling everything the media experts know about Africa's biggest country: In the Know:The Situation in Nigeria.

Frustrating development

I just read an essay that helps put into perspective the failure of Ghana and other countries to fulfill the great promises that independence seemed to open up (see my note below on Ghana). The articulate Jamaican-born cultural theorist Stuart Hall puts it this way:

The decolonization that occurred at the end of World War II, often hailed as 'setting the colonial world free', was in fact marked by three broad stages redefining relations between the developed West and the rest. In the first phase, fundamental relations of neocolonial dependency were established between the developed and underdeveloped worlds in the context of the Cold War. ...the Cold War was fought out largely by proxy on post-colonial terrain. In the second phase, 'structural adjustment' regimes were imposed by the West on the developing world, via international organizations coupled with massive indebtedness through the banking system. More recently, with the collapse of the Soviet empire and the rise of the US to single super-power hegemony, an unholy alliance of global corporate forces, collusive indigenous elites, and legal and illegal armies on the loose has been able to treat the world's poor and the societies of the South as open marketplaces, repositories of scarce resources, and reservoirs of cheap labour.

(Pp. 27-28 in Hall, Stuart. "Cosmopolitan Promises, Multicultural Realities." Divided Cities: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 2003. Ed. Richard Scholar. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 20-51.)

Photo of Hall from The Chronicle - Stuart Hall

Ghana and Guinea (Conakry) were among the countries that resisted being sucked into the Cold War, but Ghanaian cocoa farmers and others, backed by the C.I.A., readily enlisted and overthrew Kwame Nkrumah in 1966. Sékou Touré, who had led the République de Guinée to independence (and became the exiled Nkrumah's host) hung on to power until his death in 1984, but the international agencies mentioned by Hall (initially, the aggressive economic and diplomatic actions of France) made serious economic development impossible.

"Untill is over": Ghana at last

After more than 40 years of waiting like a hunter in the bush for an opportunity to see West Africa, "Untill is over" -- as a sign painted on a fish-market kiosque in Elmina told me.

Elmina, on Ghana's coast on the Gulf of Guinea, started out as a 17th century Portuguese trading post for gold from the rich mines to the north (the name is a corruption of Sao Jorge da Mina, or "of the Mine"). Later, under Dutch control, it became a major shipping center for slaves bound for the New World. Touring its castle (combination fort and dungeon) is chilling, as is the former British counterpart, Cape Coast Castle, just across the river and almost within cannon-range. But outside, at the base of the castle walls, is a bustling fishing port, full of life, recently dead fish and mysterious slogans, including "Untill is over."

I don't know what it meant to the person who painted it, but to me the "untill" that was over was my long wait to know this part of the world. When I was a college student in the early 60s, West Africa seemed to me the most exciting place on earth. The whole "Third World" was in turmoil then -- Southeast Asia, Latin America, Indonesia. But it was Africa that was making the most direct challenge to the structures and the ideology of global system of spoliation for the enrichment of a few. The continent appeared to be on the verge of a transformation that would liberate us all from our sad history of racism and colonial oppression.

The Gold Coast was the first African colony to become independent, in 1957 shedding its slave-name to take that of a West African empire of centuries earlier, Ghana. I was 16 then. As a college student, a followed developments there and in the neighboring countries as closely as I could from the distance of Cambridge, Massachusetts. I was especially enthusiastic about the movements -- intellectual and political -- in the French-speaking areas, and wrote my senior thesis on Sékou Touré's Parti démocratique de Guinée. But I wasn't able at that time to find a way to actually go to the region and work there (I didn't want merely to visit, but to do something).

So instead I went to Latin America, a decision I don't regret, because I was able to do there what I had imagined doing in Africa: to make myself part of a larger struggle. I never ceased day-dreaming of being in Africa, and finally got there for the 50th anniversary of Ghana's independence.

Susana, ever alert, learned of a conference titled African Architecture Today to be held in Kumasi, Ghana's second largest city, June 5-8. Our work (a book she and I are writing together) is a history of architecture and urbanism in Latin America, an ocean away from Africa. But when she read the call for papers, she saw that the conference was to debate the same kinds of issues that have deeply engaged Latin American architects for over 20 years, basically, regional identity (Is there one, for a large and diverse area such as Latin America or Africa?) and how best to express it (or "them," the identities of the various subregions) in architecture. And so we got ourselves invited to Kumasi (where Susana's powerpoint presentation and talk was a big hit -- the African architects were eager to know more about this other "Third World"). And of course we took advantage of this, our first visit to equatorial Africa, to see as much of the country as we could in a few days on a modest budget.

Highlights included the conference itself, at the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology; markets, villages and shrines in Ashanti country; the hard, cruel slave castles on the coast; a canopy-walk on suspended bridges through the rainforest at Kakum National Park; the filthy but friendly chaos of Accra; fufu, banku, kenkey and pepper sauce, and especially the gentle grace and courtesy of almost everyone we met.

Map from Lonely Planet & from announcement of the tour Susana & I took with three other conference participants whom I remember fondly. Thanks very much for your company, Felicia, David and Dumisani! Also thanks to Charles, our guide, and Samson, the driver -- excellent tour.

Reasons for optimism

Happy new year! Reasons for optimism in 2003:
1) Hugo Chávez will probably survive the employers' strike in Venezuela, which is good, and will also have to pay closer attention to the demands of the middle class, which is also be good.
2) Luiz Inacio da Silva, "Lula," is sure to advance economic democracy in Latin America's largest country, Brazil.
3) The Russians' stupid repression of Chechens, and the Chechens' reckless assaults on Russians, may so exhaust the patience of Russian citizens that they force Putin to change policy or get out.
4) Good people in Africa will keep trying (against terrible odds) to make democracy a habit -- Kenya may be the latest example.
5) The Israelis will run out of ways to punish Palestinians and out of patience with their own aggressive settlers, so more of them will demand that the government seek peace.
6) Palestinians are running out of families willing to sacrifice their children in suicidal attacks, so more of them will be willing to respond.
7) My latest novel, just completed, will become a best-seller and a movie, which will make me and my friends very happy.